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Abstract
In a non-stationary job search model we allow unemployed workers to
have a permanent option to leave the labor force. Transitions into non-
participation occur when reservation wages drop below the utility of being
nonparticipant. Taking account of these transitions allows the identifica-
tion of duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer
distribution. We estimate the structural model with individual data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel and use simulated maximum likelihood.
The results show that the presence of significant negative duration depen-
dence in the wage offer distribution causes reservation wages to decrease.
The rate at which job offers arrive is constant over the unemployment
duration. These findings provide micro evidence that the job search envi-
ronment of unemployed workers is non-stationary because of loss of skills.
∗Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences.
†Free University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, Scholar and CEPR.
Address: Department of Economics, Free University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105,
NL–1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Keywords: endogenous nonparticipation, non-stationary job search, duration dependence,
structural empirical analysis, simulated maximum likelihood, heterogeneity.
We are grateful to Rob Alessie, Annette Bergemann, Barbara Petrongolo, Uwe Sunde,
Gerard van den Berg, the participants of the CEPR workshop on a Dynamic Approach to
Europe’s Unemployment Problem in Berlin 2003, two anonymous referees and the editors for
useful comments.
1 Introduction
European labor markets are characterized by a low inflow into unemployment,
long benefits entitlement and high proportions of long-term unemployed workers
(e.g. Bean, 1994; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; and Machin and Manning, 1999).
For many possible reasons, individuals might quit searching for work while being
unemployed and leave the labor force. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for
instance note that in Germany around 30% of the unemployed workers leave
to nonparticipation. Although this proportion is substantial, in the empirical
microeconomic literature not much attention has been given to nonparticipation.
In the empirical literature that does consider nonparticipation, the usual ap-
proach is to consider transitions from unemployment into nonparticipation as
stochastic occurrences. Burdett, Kiefer, Mortensen and Neumann (1984) analyze
a model where individuals in a particular labor market state randomly receive of-
fers from the other labor market states. Individuals accept an offer if it improves
their expected present value of future utility. Such a stationary model is esti-
mated by Mortensen and Neumann (1984). Similarly, Weiner (1984) estimates
a reduced-form model allowing for duration dependence where nonparticipation
is a competing risk. A related approach is chosen by Van den Berg (1990b)
who estimates a (stationary) job search model, where each unemployed worker is
exposed to the same risk of becoming nonparticipant.
These studies have in common that they assume that transitions into nonpar-
ticipation are only possible at stochastically determined moments. If a worker
becomes disabled, considering nonparticipation as a risk seems reasonable. In
case a worker is offered the possibility of early retirement, there arguably is both
a stochastic and a choice element in the transition to nonparticipation. How-
ever, these reasons for nonparticipation mainly apply to employed workers. For
unemployed workers, early retirement is impossible and the risk of disability is
much smaller than for employed workers. Many unemployed workers who stop
searching for jobs start a family or pursue different interests in life. Because this
is a choice, it is more appropriate to assume that at any moment during a spell
of unemployment it is possible for an individual to quit searching for work and
become nonparticipant voluntarily.
In this paper we allow unemployed workers to permanently have the possibil-
ity to quit searching for work and leave the labor force. In particular, we extend
the job search framework of Van den Berg (1990a) by assuming that unemployed
workers have this option. In a stationary environment, i.e. when both the ex-
pected returns to job search and the utility of being nonparticipant are constant,
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unemployed individuals either enter nonparticipation immediately after becom-
ing unemployed or never become nonparticipant. Since we observe individuals
moving into nonparticipation after some time spent in unemployment, the envi-
ronment faced by the unemployed worker must be non-stationary. For the unem-
ployed workers who enter nonparticipation, the expected present value of being
unemployed must be declining in the unemployment duration. Additionally, be-
cause reservation wages include the value of future options, the permanent option
of entering nonparticipation changes the reservation wage path and alters the dis-
tribution of accepted wages and re-employment rates. The job search model con-
sidered in this paper allows two structural elements to be non-stationary, i.e. the
job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution. The structural approach
taken in this paper allows us to distinguish between non-stationarity in these
structural elements, and the observed transitions to nonparticipation improve
their identification.
When studying the transition from unemployment to employment, failing
to take exits to nonparticipation into account may cause several biases. First,
unemployed workers with low expected returns to job search quit job searching
earlier than unemployed workers with high expected returns of job search. Exits
to nonparticipation are thus not independent of the re-employment probabilities
and can therefore not be treated as exogenous right-censoring of the duration
of unemployment. Second, since individuals with high expected returns to job
search continue searching for a longer duration (e.g. Van Soest, Fontein and
Euwals, 1996), these individuals are more likely to exit to employment.
In the theoretical literature many sources of non-stationarity in the job search
process are discussed, and these sources are the foundations for many macro-
economic models of hysteresis in European unemployment levels. According to
Bean (1994), the high level of European unemployment is mainly associated with
low re-employment probabilities, rather than a high incidence of unemployment.
This high occurrence of long-term unemployment stresses the importance of non-
stationarity in the job search process. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) introduce
ranking as an explanation for stigmatization of long-term unemployed workers. If
employers use the unemployment duration of job applicants as a signal for their
ability, long-term unemployed workers get stigmatized and receive less job offers.
Along with the job offer arrival rate also the worker’s reservation wage decreases,
which affects post-unemployment wages. Calmfors and Lang (1995) provide dis-
couragement of unemployed workers as a possible explanation for negative du-
ration dependence. Discouragement has similar implications as stigmatization.
Calmfors and Lang (1995) also mention the possibility that unemployed workers
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eventually get so discouraged by failing to find a job that they quit searching and
choose to become nonparticipant permanently. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) ar-
gue that the persistently high European unemployment level in the last decades is
due to a combination of institutional factors and (heterogeneous) loss of skills at
the start and during unemployment. The generous unemployment benefits sys-
tems in most European countries causes the unemployed workers with few skills
to be very selective in accepting job offers, which increases their unemployment
duration. If unemployed workers are exposed to loss of skills, the generous unem-
ployment benefits payments in Europe aggravate, especially in volatile economic
periods, the percentage of long-term unemployed workers. In our model, loss of
skills are mainly reflected by decreasing wages associated with job offers. See
Machin and Manning (1999) for a survey of explanations of duration dependence
and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for a survey of the consequences of negative
duration dependence in the job search process for European unemployment rates.
Each source of duration dependence in the job search process has different
policy implications. For example, training and schooling programs can be useful
in case of loss of skills, extensive monitoring of search behavior when discour-
agement is the main source of duration dependence, and employer subsidies for
hiring long-term unemployed might be a useful policy in the presence of stigma-
tization.1 Therefore it is important to have an indication about the underlying
source of duration dependence. Reduced-form empirical analyses cannot distin-
guish between different reasons for non-stationarity in the job search process.
Machin and Manning (1999) mention that nearly all empirical work is based on
the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) framework.2 Both Machin and Manning
(1999) and Van den Berg (2001) argue that the MPH framework is convenient,
but that it has no structural base. Only in very special cases, such as when
unemployed workers are myopic or when job offers are never rejected, the MPH
framework has a structural interpretation. These cases are so restrictive that they
are not very interesting to investigate. We will compare reduced-form estimation
results with the estimation results of the structural model.
The paper contributes to the current policy debate on active labor market
policies (ALMPs). In the last few years the OECD strongly advocated ALMPs
and the European Union adopted this as a cornerstone of macroeconomic policy
1It is not clear if employer bonuses may overcome stigmatization of long-term unemployed
workers. These bonuses might be a reasons for stigmatization itself.
2Recently, some studies focused on the importance of ‘scarring’ due to unemployment on
wage changes. Gregory and Jukes (2001) for instance estimate that in the UK a year of
unemployment causes a 10% reduction in wages compared to a previous job. Their study does
not address the underlying causes of this wage reduction, which makes interpretation difficult.
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in 1997. The total percentage of GDP spent on ALMPs in the European Union
increased from about 0.8% in 1995 to over 1% in 2001 (OECD Employment
Outlook, 2003). Knowledge of duration dependence in job search contributes to
the debate in two ways. First, presence of duration dependence can be interpreted
as evidence that the search environment of unemployed workers changes during
unemployment, which provides some reasons to expect that job search can be
stimulated using ALMPs. Second, the timing of duration dependence indicates
the optimal timing of ALMPs. Our empirical results show that the individual’s
ability to attract high wage offers decreases already in the first few quarters of
unemployment and flattens afterwards. Following Machin and Manning (1999),
who stress that policy interventions should be aimed at the period were duration
dependence is most pronounced, the effectiveness of ALMPs is potentially largest
when directed at individuals who are still short-term unemployed. Furthermore,
our results show that the transition rate into nonparticipation is increasing in the
beginning of unemployment. Late policy interventions might therefore not reach
a substantial share of individuals who already left the labor force early. Our
policy recommendations coincide with Keese and Martin (2002), who advocate
early and sustained policy interventions for young unemployed workers.
In the empirical analyses we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), which is a household survey. From this database we extracted a flow
sample of individuals who entered unemployment between January 1989 and
December 1995. Since we are mainly interested in reasons for leaving the labor
force other than retiring, we only include unemployed workers younger than 45
years in our data set. Other than the length of the unemployment spell, the
destination state and the post-unemployment wage, the database also includes the
reservation wage. For some individuals we observe multiple unemployment spells.
This allows us to distinguish true duration dependence in the job offer arrival
rate and the wage offer distribution from unobserved and observed individual
heterogeneity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the non-stationary
job search model which allows for endogenous nonparticipation. We derive the
model, show some of its features, and briefly discuss the identification of the
model and the parameterization. In Section 3 we briefly discuss some institutional
aspects of German unemployment and give an overview of the data. Section
4 presents the results of reduced-form analyses. In particular, we estimate a
competing risks model for the transitions from unemployment to employment
and to nonparticipation and we estimate a wage equation. The estimation results
of the structural model are presented in Section 5, along with a discussion of the
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estimation methods. We also present separate estimation results for men and
women. Section 6 concludes.
2 The non-stationary job search model
2.1 Outline of the model
In this section we present the structural framework used to model the transition
from unemployment to employment and to nonparticipation. The model is based
on continuous-time job search theory (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986). The model
extends the non-stationary framework of Van den Berg (1990a) by allowing for
endogenous nonparticipation, i.e. during unemployment individuals permanently
have the option of exiting to nonparticipation. We allow both the rate at which
job offers arrive and the wage offer distribution to change over the elapsed du-
ration of unemployment. After presenting the outline of the model, we briefly
discuss identification. We end this section with the parameterization.
Consider an unemployed worker being active on a labor market with 3 dis-
tinct labor market states: unemployment, employment and nonparticipation. Let
t denote time, with t = 0 the moment of entering unemployment. During un-
employment individuals receive job offers according to a Poisson process with an
arrival rate λt ≥ 0. A job offer is characterized by the wage w associated to the job
offer. These wages are independent realizations from the wage offer distribution
with continuous distribution function Ft(w) (with finite mean, EF [w|t] < ∞). At
the moment a job is offered, an individual has to decide immediately to accept
this job or to reject it and continue searching. We do not allow for the possibility
to reconsider job offers at a later stage. Once an unemployed worker decides
to accept a job offer, he keeps the job forever at the same wage. We exclude
on-the-job search and the possibility of losing a job. The instantaneous utility
of being employed equals the wage received by the worker. Individuals discount
future utility at the common subjective rate ρ ≥ 0.
Like Calmfors and Lang (1995), we consider nonparticipation as an absorb-
ing state. An individual in this state receives a (time-invariant) instantaneous
utility, unp. The model could be generalized by allowing the utility of being non-
participant to vary over the unemployment duration. This is shown in the formal
exposition in the Appendix. Whilst unemployed, individuals receive a constant
benefit level b ≥ 0, which equals the instantaneous utility of being unemployed.
Consider the case in which the horizon is infinite and the individual has perfect
foresight, i.e. he knows for each t ≥ 0 his values of λt and Ft(w), and anticipates
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future changes in these parameters. Unemployed workers do not know in advance
when job offers arrive and what the associated wages are. Individuals maximize
their expected present value of future utility. This implies for unemployed workers
that they move to nonparticipation once the expected present value of continuing
searching for jobs is lower than the utility of being nonparticipant. Let Rt denote
the expected present value of being unemployed for t periods. The Bellman’s
equation for Rt satisfies
Rt = max
{
unp
ρ
, b4t + λt4t(1− ρ4t)EFt
[
max
{
w
ρ
−Rt+4t, 0
}]
+ (1− ρ4t)Rt+4t
}
(1)
¿From the Bellman’s equation it is easy to see that if the expected present value
of being unemployed for t periods exceeds the present value of nonparticipation
(Rt >
unp
ρ
), the unemployed worker continues to search for a job and once he
receives a job offer it is optimal to accept it if the associated wage exceeds ρRt,
which is denoted as the reservation wage at t, φt. The optimal strategy of the
unemployed worker is therefore characterized by a sequence of reservation wages
(φt, ∀t ≥ 0) and the maximum duration of staying unemployed before becom-
ing nonparticipant (t¯). The unemployed worker accepts the first job offer which
has a wage above the reservation wage or he moves to nonparticipation if his
unemployment duration exceeds the maximum length of unemployment. The
decision problem of the unemployed worker thus reduces to determining the se-
quence of reservation wages. Given the optimal value of t¯, the optimal path of
the reservation wage for 0 ≤ t ≤ t¯ is given by
∂φt
∂t
= ρφt − ρb− λt
∫ ∞
φt
(w − φt) dFt(w) (2)
The differential equation (2) for the reservation path, also given in Mortensen
(1986) and Van den Berg (1990a), is well known and has been analyzed exten-
sively. The way to ascertain the optimal time to go into nonparticipation is to
solve the maximization problem
max
t¯≥0
φ0|(φt¯ = unp)
¿From this equation it follows that t¯ has to be found by solving φ0 for all possible
values of t¯, which is time-consuming because the calculation of φ0 requires the
solution to the entire path of reservation wages. The Appendix gives an algo-
rithm for finding t¯ and provides conditions under which t¯ is unique. It might
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be clear that unemployed workers only enter nonparticipation if the reservation
wage decreases over some range of unemployment duration.
The transition rate from unemployment to employment equals
θ(t) = λt(1− Ft(φt)) ∀t ≤ t¯ (3)
and does not exist for t > t¯. Let t be the realized duration when leaving to
employment. The conditional density function of t can be written as
f(t) = θ(t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θ(s)ds
)
∀t ≤ t¯
In Figure 1 we show how the reservation wage path changes when taking non-
participation into account as a permanent option for the unemployed worker. In
the beginning of the unemployment spell the reservation wage allowing for non-
participation lies slightly above the reservation wage without nonparticipation.
The difference between these reservation wage paths increases during the spell of
unemployment. Since the reservation wage path is affected by the possibility of
nonparticipation also the acceptance probability of a job offer and therefore also
the transition rates to work and the average post-unemployment wages change.
2.2 Some remarks on the identification
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the identification of the structural elements
of the model. These structural elements are the wage offer distribution Ft(w),
the job offer arrival rate λt, the discount rate ρ, and the instantaneous utility
of nonparticipation unp. The identification is very much in line with Flinn and
Heckman (1982).
Let us for a moment assume that we observe the unemployed worker’s reser-
vation wage path. From the accepted post-unemployment wages after an unem-
ployment spell of t periods we can identify the wage offer distribution above the
reservation wage Ft(w|w > φt). It is well known from Flinn and Heckman (1982)
that the tail of the wage offer distribution below the reservation wage cannot be
identified.
The re-employment hazard after unemployment duration t is given by λt(1−
Ft(φt)). This hazard can be identified from the observed unemployment dura-
tions. However, it implies that the job offer arrival rate can only be identified
up to a normalization. A high job offer arrival rate associated with a wage offer
distribution that has some mass close to 0 cannot be distinguished from a low
job offer arrival rate. To establish identification we will assume that the shape of
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the wage offer distribution is known up to a time-varying mean and an unknown
standard deviation.
The instantaneous utility of being nonparticipant unp can be identified from
the length of the unemployment spell until entering nonparticipation. If the
unemployed worker enters nonparticipation after an unemployment duration of t
periods, the instantaneous utility of nonparticipation equals the reservation wage
after t periods, i.e. unp = φt.
Finally, the discount rate ρ is identified from the observed reservation wage
path. In the differential equation (2) describing the optimal reservation wage
path all elements except for ρ are identified or observed. So solving the optimal
reservation wage path identifies the discount rate ρ. In particular, to identify ρ
it is only necessary to observe the reservation wage φt and the first derivative of
the reservation wage with respect to the unemployment duration ∂φt/∂t at one
particular unemployment duration.3
So far, we have supposed that the complete reservation wage path of the
unemployed worker is observed. However, the data do not provide the complete
reservation wage path, but only observations of the reservation wage if the worker
was unemployed at the moment of the interview. Since the moment of the inter-
view is unrelated to the start of the unemployment spell, for different individuals
we observe different parts of the reservation wage path. Flinn and Heckman
(1982) stress that in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity similar identifica-
tion results can be derived if reservation wages are unobserved. Identification
then hinges on the fact that the minimum of the accepted wages after unem-
ployment duration t equals the reservation wage after unemployment duration
t. With unobserved heterogeneity this result no longer holds. This stresses the
importance of observing reservation wages as these help identify the distribution
of unobservables.
2.3 Parameterization
In this subsection, we discuss the parameterization of the unknown structural
elements introduced in the previous subsections. We denote the vector of observed
individual characteristics by x.
The structural model can be estimated in continuous time if it has a closed
form solution for the reservation wage path. Only for very restricted specifications
3In practice, observing the reservation wage with respect to the unemployment duration
∂φt/∂t would imply observing the reservation wages at two unemployment durations close to
each other.
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of the wage offer distribution such a closed form solution exists. Since we want
to avoid an overly restrictive parametric specification, we maintain flexibility by
estimating the model as a discrete time dynamic programming model (see e.g.
Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989). In the data, the unit of time equals one month.
However, we allow each month to include four periods of search of equal time
length in which an individual can receive at most one job offer.4
Since we estimate the model in discrete time instead of continuous time, we
specify a job offer arrival probability instead of a rate. We allow this probability to
vary over the duration of unemployment and over both observed and unobserved
individuals characteristics. The unobserved characteristics are denoted by vλ.
We use a logistic distribution to specify the job offer arrival probability
λt(x, vλ) =
exp(λ(t) + x′βλ + vλ)
1 + exp(λ(t) + x′βλ + vλ)
For the wage offer distribution we use a lognormal distribution function with
parameters µt(x, vµ) and σ
2
w, where vµ is the unobserved heterogeneity term in the
wage offer distribution. The lognormal distribution function is the most common
used specification for the wage offer distribution in the empirical literature on this
type of job search model (e.g. Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985; and Wolpin,
1987). It is convenient since it generates relatively easy forms for the reservation
wage path. Since σ2w is assumed to be constant between individuals and over the
duration of unemployment, all changes in the wage offer distribution come from
changes in µt(x, vµ). For this parameter we choose an additive specification
µt(x, vµ) = µ(t) + x
′βµ + vµ
If we would only observe one unemployment spell for each individual, we would
not be able to identify the distribution of vµ. However, for a number of individuals
we observe more than one unemployment spell, which allows us to actually include
an observed heterogeneity term in the wage offer distribution.
For both types of duration dependence λ(t) and µ(t) we choose relatively
flexible specifications,
λ(t) =
∑
i=0,3,6,...
(
3− (t− i)
3
λi +
t− i
3
λi+3
)
I(i ≤ t < i + 3)
and
µ(t) =
∑
i=0,3,6,...
(
3− (t− i)
3
µi +
t− i
3
µi+3
)
I(i ≤ t < i + 3)
4The search unit of time should be sufficiently small, such that unemployed workers receive
at most one job offer within the unit period.
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with I(·) being the indicator function. The functional forms imply that we specify
the value of λt and µt at the beginning of each three month period and assume lin-
ear changes during the quarter. For the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
in the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution, we choose a bivariate
discrete distribution with two unrestricted mass-point locations for each term.
Let vaλ, v
b
λ, v
a
µ and v
b
µ denote the points of support of vλ and vµ, respectively. The
associated probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(vλ = v
a
λ, vµ = v
a
µ) = paa Pr(vλ = v
b
λ, vµ = v
a
µ) = pba
Pr(vλ = v
a
λ, vµ = v
b
µ) = pab Pr(vλ = v
b
λ, vµ = v
b
µ) = pbb
with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = aa, . . . , bb, and pbb = 1− paa − pab − pba.
Finally, as mentioned in the previous subsection, the instantaneous utility of
being nonparticipant is considered to be constant during the unemployment spell.
However, we do allow this to depend on both observed (x) and unobserved (v)
individual characteristics and on the level of unemployment benefits
unp(b, x, v) = exp([1 log(b) x
′]βnp + vnp)
where vnp is distributed according to a normal distribution function with mean 0
and variance σ2np.
To be able to compute the reservation wage path backwards we impose that
after some fixed unemployment duration T, both the job offer arrival rate λ(t)
and the wage offer distribution function Ft(w) remain constant. This serves as a
initial condition establishing a unique solution of the reservation wage path. We
take this fixed duration T to be two years.
3 Data and institutions
In this section we first briefly discuss some institutional aspects in Germany
during the observation period, which is from January 1989 until December 1995,
and we provide some aggregated statistics. Then we give an overview of the data
used in the empirical analyses.
3.1 Institutions and background information
The German unemployment benefits system contains three types of unemploy-
ment compensation schemes. If a worker involuntarily loses his job he is either
entitled to Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) or to Un-
employment Assistance (UA) benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe). The worker receives
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UI benefits if the worker was employed during 360 days out of the past 3 years.
The UI benefits are of limited duration, with the entitlement period depending on
the worker’s age and his employment history. The requirement for receiving UI
benefits are being registered at the labor office and being available and actively
searching for a job. After the UI benefits period expires the worker is eligible for
UA benefits, which are of unlimited duration.
The UI benefits level is 68% of the previous income (net of taxes) for individu-
als with dependent children and 60% for unemployed workers without dependent
children. The levels of UA benefits are 58% and 53% of the previous earnings
respectively. For both UI en UA there is a minimum and maximum level of bene-
fits. The drop in benefits level is thus relatively small when the eligibility period
of UI benefits expires. Compared to other countries, such as the US where un-
employment benefits eventually run out, in Germany the level of unemployment
benefits is very static.5
Individuals who do not qualify for UI or UA benefits are eligible for collecting
welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe). For example, unemployed individuals, whose pre-
vious state was full-time education, receive these benefits. Welfare benefits are
means-tested and of unlimited duration. The level of welfare benefits depends
on the household situation and the age of the dependent children. The welfare
benefits do not require the unemployed worker to actively search for work.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) present some (empirical) net replacement rates
for Germany. In 1994 the net replacement rate for single unemployed workers
was 66% and after the first year of unemployment it decreased to 63%, where it
remained constant until the fifth year of unemployment. For unemployed workers
with a dependent spouse the replacement rates were 74% during the first year of
unemployment and 72% from the second year onwards.
In Figure 2 we present the unemployment rate in Germany during the ob-
servation period. We also show the unemployment rates stratified to former
East-Germany and West-Germany. Reliable unemployment rates for former East-
Germany from before 1991 are not available. The figure shows that during the
observation period, the unemployment rate in East-Germany is almost twice that
of West-Germany. The level of the unemployment rate remains relatively con-
stant during the observation period. Only in 1991 was the unemployment rate
in East-Germany lower than during the period thereafter. However, this might
have to do with the start of collecting aggregated unemployment figures for East-
Germany.
Between 1990 and 1994, in Germany only 0.5% of the workers between 15 and
5See Hunt (1995) for a more extensive discussion of the net replacement rates.
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44 years old were collecting some type of disability benefits. This percentage is
particularly low compared to other countries such as the US, the UK, Sweden,
where in the same period around 2.5% of the workers received disability bene-
fits (see Buddelmeyer, 2001). For older workers in Germany, the percentage of
workers collecting disability benefits increases dramatically. This is in accordance
with the German labor force participation. For both men and women the labor
force participation is high compared to other countries for workers until age 50
and than it decreases rapidly (see OECD, Employment Outlook, various years).
On the other hand, part-time work and short-working hours are less common in
Germany than in most other countries.
Another interesting indicator is the percentage of unemployed workers who
have been long-term unemployed. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) report that in
Germany the percentages remain very constant during our observation period. In
1989, 66.7% of the stock of unemployed workers was already unemployed for more
than 6 months and 49.0% for more than a year. These percentages where slightly
lower in 1995, respectively 65.4% of the unemployed workers was unemployed
for more than 6 months and 48.3% longer than a year. Machin and Manning
(1999) compare for 1995 the unemployment rates and percentages of long-term
unemployed workers between different countries. They show that, compared to
the unemployment rate in Germany, the percentage of long-term unemployed
workers is relatively high. This implies that in Germany unemployment is more
persistent than in other countries.6 Finally, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argue,
based on measures summarized in the OECD Employment Outlook (1999), that
in Germany employment protection has been roughly stable since the early 1970s.
3.2 Data
The micro data we use for the empirical analyses are from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is a longitudinal panel survey. An extensive
discussion on the construction of this database is given in Wagner, Burkhauser
and Behringer (1993). The GSOEP started in 1984 in West-Germany. East-
German households have been included since 1990. The total number of individ-
uals included in the database is about 20,000.
Yearly, all members of the households older than 16 years are interviewed.
Those who leave the household stay in the panel as long as they remain in Ger-
many. People who join households with original members of the panel are also
6Both Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Machin and Manning (1999) base their figures on
the OECD Economic Outlook (1991, 1995).
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interviewed as long as they stay in such a household. The attrition from the
panel is low and is compensated by household members reaching the age of 16
who thereby enter the panel.
The GSOEP contains extensive information on the labor market behavior
of individual respondents in the year preceding the moment of interview. In
particular, respondents are asked to report their labor market states for each
month in the previous year. The respondents can choose between 12 states and
are allowed to choose multiple states for the same month:
1. Full-time employment
2. Short-working hours
3. Part-time employment
4. Vocational training
5. Unemployment
6. Retirement
7. Maternity leave
8. School and college
9. Military and civil service
10. Housewife or househusband
11. Second job
12. Other
We consider and individual to be employed if he reports states 1-3, 9 or 11;
an individual is unemployed if he reports state 5 and not one of the employment
states; and an individual is considered to be nonparticipant if he reports states
7, 10 or 12 and not one of the employment states or the unemployment state.
State 6 does not arise in our final sample (see below). By comparing individ-
ual labor market states in consecutive months, it is possible to construct spells
of unemployment. These spells always consist of an integer number of calendar
months. If a spell of unemployment is interrupted by a short spell of training
(state 4 or 8), we ignore these transitions and consider the interrupted spell as a
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single unemployment spell.7 We choose maternity leave (state 7) as nonpartic-
ipation state because for unemployed women maternity leave is either reported
for multiple years or is directly followed by housewife (state 10). Only 3 women
returned within one year after starting maternity leave to unemployment, for
them we have right-censored the spell of unemployment at the start of maternity
leave. Military service (state 9) is uncommon in our subsample, as most people
enter military service immediately after leaving school. Since military service is
almost always followed by employment, we considered it as an employment state.
Unemployment is self-reported and is hence not necessarily equal to being regis-
tered at an unemployment agency. Similarly, nonparticipants may be registered
at an unemployment agency and receive unemployment benefits.
Because we are mainly interested in reasons for leaving the labor force other
than retirement, we restrict the data set to the 2044 individuals between 17
and 45 years old. We exclude 106 individuals for which ‘region of residence’,
‘gender’ or ‘years of education’ is missing. For the remaining 1938 individuals, we
construct a flow sample by considering spells of unemployment starting between
January 1989 and December 1995. The individuals in our data set experienced
2645 spells of unemployment. As mentioned in Subsection 2.3, we only model
the job search behavior during the first 2 years of unemployment. Therefore, we
artificially right-censor unemployment spells after 2 years. Of the unemployment
spells 65% ends because the unemployed workers became employed and 8% of
the spells of unemployment ends in nonparticipation. The remaining 27% of the
unemployment spells is right-censored. Because most right-censoring occurs at
the end of the observation period (the month of the last interview), we treat it
as exogenous.
An important issue is the level of unemployment benefits. Recall that the
effect of benefit profiles on reservation wage paths is large. For 948 spells we
do not observe the benefits level. It seems very unlikely that these individuals
have no income at all. Most of these spells are spells with a short unemployment
duration: 490 of those spells had an unemployment duration less than 3 months
and 878 less than 1 year. Excluding these spells from the data set would cause
a bias toward long-term unemployment spells and would thus affect duration
dependence. Therefore, we impute for the spells with a missing benefits level, a
7During the last decades a large variety of publicly funded training and schooling programs
for unemployed workers has become available in Germany (see e.g. Hujer, Maurer and Wellner,
1999). Because the main objective of these programs is stimulating re-employment, an unem-
ployed worker who enters the state of training or schooling can continue searching for jobs. We
follow Pannenberg and Schwarze (1996), who investigated measures of labor market tightness,
by considering this training as a continuation of unemployment.
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level of unemployment benefits. We stratify the data set into 4 subsamples based
on the observed unemployment duration, a subsample with spells shorter than
3 months, a subsample with spells between 3 and 6 months, a subsample with
spells between 6 months and 1 year and a subsample with spells over 1 year. For
each of these subsamples we regressed the log benefits level on a set of individual
characteristics including the previous wage. If the previous wage was unobserved
we replaced it with the post-unemployment wage. If the benefits level is missing
we impute it with a draw from the log-linear regression.
The personal characteristics of the respondents are recorded at the begin-
ning of the spell of unemployment and are considered time-invariant. The set of
characteristics include the age in years, an indicator function for having children,
years of education, being female, having a non-German nationality, and the region
in which the unemployed worker lives.8 Furthermore, for most of the individu-
als we observe the marital status. For individuals for whom this is missing, we
add a dummy variable that indicates missing. We also observe the spell-specific
characteristics “labor market state before inflow into unemployment” and “local
unemployment rate”. The first variable indicates if the individual entered un-
employment out of employment or from out of the labor force, which are mainly
new entrants on the labor market. The local unemployment rate is the unem-
ployment rate in the state at the moment of entering unemployment. Finally, we
have observations on individually reported reservation wages in the years 1992,
1993 and 1994. Because the reservation wage was only asked if the worker was
unemployed at the date of the interview, we only observe the individual reser-
vation wage for 14% of the spells. Hence the individual reservation wage is not
always registered at the beginning of a spell. We return to this issue in Subsec-
tion 5.1. The unemployment benefits, post-unemployment wages and reservation
wages are measured in January 1991 D-Mark.
Table 1 provides some statistics of the data set. Females, individuals with
children, married individuals, residents of North-Germany and individuals who
entered unemployment after having been out of the labor force are more likely to
exit unemployment to nonparticipation. However, most striking is the difference
in average individual reservation wage corresponding to unemployment spells ex-
iting to employment and to nonparticipation. The average individual reservation
8We distinguish 5 regions in Germany; South-Germany (Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg),
Mid-(West-)Germany (Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate and Hesse), North-Germany (Bremen,
Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein), (former-)East-
Germany (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Turingia),
and Berlin. The grouping is on the basis of average incomes.
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wage is around 265 D-Mark lower if the spell ended in nonparticipation. This
suggests that unemployed workers who enter nonparticipation have worse labor
market prospects than other unemployed workers, which indicates a substantial
level of selectivity for transitions to nonparticipation. Finally, the correlation
between the unemployment duration and the post-unemployment wage is −0.15,
indicating that individuals who have been unemployed for a relatively long period
have a lower post-unemployment wage. This might either be caused by genuine
duration dependence or by heterogeneity of unemployed workers. The correlation
between the observed reservation wage and the post-unemployment wage is 0.58,
which means the observed reservation wage is a good indicator for labor market
prospects. In around 16% of the cases the observed reservation wage exceeds the
post-unemployment wage. In all these cases the duration between the moment
of observing the reservation wage and the moment of leaving unemployment was
relatively long. In fact, the correlation between the difference between the post-
unemployment wage and the reservation wage and the difference in the moment
that these are observed is −0.28. This suggests that the job search environ-
ment is indeed non-stationairy, as the difference between mean wages and mean
reservation wages becomes smaller if the time between observing them increases.
Figure 3 shows how the (empirical) monthly exit probabilities to employment
and nonparticipation change over the duration of unemployment. The probabil-
ities of a transition to a job clearly decrease over the duration of unemployment.
However, this type of figure is unable to distinguish between genuine duration
dependence and (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity. We return to this is-
sue in Section 4, where we perform some reduced-form analyses. The transition
probabilities to nonparticipation increase during the first year of unemployment
and thereafter decrease. In a stationary environment, such a pattern could not
occur. In our non-stationary environment, a stronger decreasing reservation wage
at some time interval causes a peak in transition probabilities.
4 Reduced-form analyses
In this section we perform some reduced-form analyses. The results provide a
benchmark for the predictions of the structural model. We estimate a competing
risks model on the unemployment duration until exit to work or exit to nonpartic-
ipation. Furthermore, we estimate a wage equation which allows the wage in the
first job after unemployment to depend on observed and unobserved individual
characteristics and on the length of the previous spell of unemployment. In both
models, the parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood.
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4.1 Unemployment duration
We use the standard continuous-time hazard rate framework to model the tran-
sition rates from unemployment to work and to nonparticipation (see e.g. Lan-
caster, 1990; and Van den Berg, 2001). We assume that differences in transition
rates can be characterized by observed characteristics x, unobserved characteris-
tics v and the elapsed unemployment duration t itself. Also we assume both x and
v to remain constant within an unemployment spell and v to be independent of
x. In particular, we impose that v is constant within all unemployment spells of
a given individual, i.e. we exploit that the data provide multiple unemployment
spells for some workers.
The transition rates from unemployment to work and to nonparticipation
at t conditional on x and v are denoted by θw(t|x, vw) and θn(t|x, vn). Both
hazard rates are assumed to have the familiar Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH)
specification
θd(t|x, vd) = λd(t) exp(x′βd + vd) d = w, n
in which λd(t) represents individual (baseline) duration dependence.
We specify the duration dependence λd(t) as piecewise constant with periods
of 3 months. The unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete distribution where
both vw and vn have 3 mass-points, which implies that the joint distribution has
9 point of support. We use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the model
(see Frijters and Van der Klaauw, 2003; for a detailed model description).
The estimation results are given in Table 2. Although we defined 9 possible
combinations of mass-point for the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity,
we only found 3 combinations which have a positive probability. In particular,
the estimation results indicate a negative correlation between the unobserved
heterogeneity term in the employment hazard and nonparticipation hazard, im-
plying that individuals who have a low probability of finding employment are
more likely to enter nonparticipation.
Females and individuals who were out of the labor force before entering un-
employment have both a lower exit rate to employment and a higher exit rate to
nonparticipation than males and previously employed individuals, respectively.
Years of education and nationality only significantly affect the exit rate to work,
while age, having children, and marital status only have a significant effect on
the rate at which individuals leave the labor force. The corresponding parameter
estimates have the expected sign, although it might be surprising that young un-
employed workers are more likely to enter nonparticipation than old unemployed
workers. However, recall that we only consider individuals under the age of 45, so
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these individual are not eligible for early retirement yet. Higher local unemploy-
ment rates significantly reduce the exit rate to work, and also the transition rates
into nonparticipation. After correcting for local unemployment rates, regional
effects are not very important anymore.
Is is not possible to assign a structural interpretation to these observed covari-
ate effects. Recall that both the exit rate to employment and to nonparticipation
are affected by all structural elements in the model. A higher job offer arrival
rate increases the exit rate to work and decreases the transition rate into non-
participation. So one might argue that males should have higher job offer arrival
rates than females. However, also a lower instantaneous utility of nonparticipa-
tion increases the exit rate to work (as is decreases the reservation wage) and
increases the transition rate into nonparticipation. It might therefore also be the
case that females have a higher utility of being nonparticipant than males. These
possibilities can be disentangled with the structural model.
The level of unemployment benefits only has a significant impact on the re-
employment rate. Unemployed workers who receive high benefits have a lower
exit rate to work. This is in accordance with the predictions from the structural
model, where higher benefits increase the reservation wage and hence decrease
the transition rate to work. If the utility of nonparticipation would not depend
on the benefits level, a high benefits level would decrease the transition rate
into nonparticipation. The level of unemployment benefits has a negative but
insignificant impact on the transition rate to nonparticipation.
The structural model predicts that reservation wages should be decreasing
during the unemployment spell, because otherwise transitions into nonparticipa-
tion would not have been observed. A decreasing reservation wage path can be
associated with both negative duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate
and in the wage offer distribution. Both types of negative duration dependence
cause the exit rate to employment to decrease, which is confirmed by the es-
timation results of the baseline hazard in the exit rate to work. The shape of
the exit rate to nonparticipation depends on how the utility of nonparticipation
is distributed within the population of unemployed workers (and on the exact
reservation wage path). The duration dependence pattern in the transition rate
to nonparticipation is hump-shaped, which implies that during the first year of
unemployment the exit rate into nonparticipation increases and afterwards it
decreases.
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4.2 Post-unemployment wages
In this subsection we investigate post-unemployment wages. We estimate a wage
equation in which we allow the wage after the j-th unemployment spell of indi-
vidual i to depend on observed characteristics xij (including the level of unem-
ployment benefits, the previous labor market state, and the length of the past
unemployment spell), and an individual-specific effect vi. In particular, we specify
the logarithm of the wage as a linear function of these explanatory variables,
log(wij) = α + x
′
ijβ + vi + εij
Furthermore, we assume that the individual-specific effects vi are random effects
distributed according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2v . Also
εij is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ
2
ε . This
equation is estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
The wage regression only contains observed wages and is thus a combination
of a selection equation into a work and the structural wage equation. Estimating
these separately using a sample selection model requires exclusion restriction.
Unfortunately, our structural model does not provide suitable exclusion restric-
tions. We have estimated some models, where we used the variables describing
the household composition and marital status as exclusion restriction. These
estimation results are available on request.
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the random effects wage equation.
The parameter estimates show that age, gender, years of education, the level of
unemployment benefits, region and the previous labor market state are the most
important individual characteristics. The post-unemployment wages of people
in (former) East-Germany is lower than in other parts of Germany. The same
holds for younger workers, females, and low-educated individuals who receive a
lower post-unemployment wage. Individuals receiving more unemployment ben-
efits have, on average, higher post-unemployment wages. The structural model
predicts that unemployed workers with higher benefits have a higher reservation
wage. Therefore, they are more selective in the job offers they accepted and they
receive higher wages. Also, individuals who were employed previous to unemploy-
ment receive higher expected post-unemployment wages compared to individuals
who entered unemployment after having been out of the labor force. This latter
group consists mainly of individuals who enter the labor force for the first time
and thus have no work experience.
The effect of the duration of the past unemployment spell on the post-un-
employment wages are closely related to the predictions of the structural model.
The length of the past unemployment spell has a negative effect on wages. One
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year of unemployment decreases post-unemployment wages by almost 10%. This
implies that the structural model is non-stationary. Again the structural model is
needed to distinguish between changes in the wage offer distribution and changes
in the job offer arrival rate.
Finally, the reduced-form wage equation does not take explicit account of
the selectivity of observed wages, i.e. we only consider observations for which
we actually observe a post-unemployment wage. However, some people might
still be unemployed or might have entered nonparticipation at the end of the
observation period. It is well known that this endogenous selectivity may cause
biased parameter estimates. The structural model takes account of this selectiv-
ity by explicitly modeling the process through which unemployed workers enter
employment.
5 Estimation of the structural model
In this section we estimate the structural model presented in Section 2. Be-
fore discussing the parameter estimates, we consider some preliminary issues and
briefly discuss the estimation method. After presenting the results of the struc-
tural model, we compare them with those of the reduced-form analysis and we
discuss the policy implications of the estimated structural model.
5.1 Some preliminary issues
For some individuals we observe the reservation wage at some moment during
their unemployment spell and/or the accepted post-unemployment wage. We
assume that both are observed with a measurement error. Let φ˜t be the observed
reservation wage after an unemployment duration of t periods and φt denotes
the true reservation wage at this moment, i.e. the reservation wage predicted
by the model. We assume that these are related by log(φ˜t) = log(φt) + εφ,
where εφ is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance η
2
φ. Similarly, we
assume that the observed accepted wage w˜t and the true post-unemployment
wage wt are related according to log(w˜t) = log(wt) + εw. In this latter case,
we do not know the true accepted wage but only know that it is distributed
according to the truncated lognormal distribution function Ft(w|w > φt). The
observed wage distribution is thus the convolution of a lognormal and truncated
lognormal distribution function. This convolution has a relatively simple closed-
form solution. Both η2φ and η
2
w can be interpreted as measures for the goodness
of fit of the model. If the estimated values of these parameters are low compared
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to the sample variances, the model describes the data well.
Another data issue concerns the instantaneous utility of nonparticipation.
Since our data consist of a flow sample of unemployed workers, there is an ini-
tial condition problem. Individuals with a very high utility of nonparticipation
would not have entered unemployment, but would have become nonparticipant
immediately.9 The distribution function of the unobserved component in the in-
stantaneous utility of nonparticipation v is thus truncated from above. It is clear
that we have to correct for this by considering the truncated distribution func-
tion of v instead of the complete distribution function in the computation of the
likelihood function. Let G(v) be the cumulative normal distribution function of
v in the whole population, this implies that in our data v is distributed according
to G(v|unp(v) < φ0).
In the remainder of this subsection we provide the individual contributions
to the log-likelihood function. We can distinguish three types of unemployment
spells, (i) a spell ending in nonparticipation, (ii) a right-censored spell, and
(iii) a spell ending in employment. For each of these spells we briefly discuss the
likelihood contributions. First, we introduce some additional notation. Let dt be a
dummy variable which indicates if the reservation wage after t periods is observed.
As mentioned above, reservation wages are observed with a measurement error,
where hφ(φ˜t|φt) is the lognormal density function for the discrepancy between
the observed and true reservation wage. Similarly, we have the lognormal density
function hw(w˜t|wt) for the observed wage. In Subsection 2.1 we only define φt
until the moment of entering nonparticipation, t ≤ t¯ (see equation (2)). Since
nonparticipants do not receive job offers, the reservation wage is undefined for
t > t¯. For ease of presentation we define φt = unp for nonparticipants (t > t¯).
The values of λt and Ft depend on the unobserved heterogeneity vλ and vµ.
Consequently also the reservation wage path φt depends on these mass points.
Below we suppress this dependence. However, for each possible set of mass points
for vλ and vµ we compute the likelihood contributions, which are in the likelihood
function weighted by their probability mass.
First, we focus on unemployment spells which end in nonparticipation. Con-
sider an unemployed worker who is observed to enter nonparticipation during
his tth period of unemployment. The instantaneous utility of nonparticipation of
this individual is below φt−1 and is by definition equal to φt. Furthermore, this
9Including individuals who entered nonparticipation without some period of unemployment
in the analysis is unattractive. This group might for example also include formerly employed
workers who became disabled. Since this is a risk rather than a choice, these type of transitions
do not fit our model.
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individual did not find a job during this period, either because he did not receive
any job offers, or because he rejected all jobs offered. The contribution to the
likelihood function of such an unemployment spell equals
∫ ∞
−∞
I (φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1)
(
t∏
s=1
(1− λs (1− Fs(φs)))
)
(
t−1∏
s=0
hφ(φ˜s|φs)ds
)
dG(v|unp(v) < φ0)
where I(·) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if the expression in paren-
theses is true and 0 if not. As mentioned earlier, φt depends on the instantaneous
utility of nonparticipation unp and thus also on v.
The likelihood contribution of a right-censored unemployment spell is similar
to that of a spell ending in nonparticipation. The difference is that there is no
lower bound for the instantaneous utility of nonparticipation. The contribution
to the likelihood function is thus∫ ∞
−∞
I (unp(v) < φt)
(
t∏
s=1
(1− λs (1− Fs(φs)))
)
(
t−1∏
s=0
hφ(φ˜s|φs)ds
)
dG(v|unp(v) < φ0)
Finally, the last type of unemployment spells are spells ending into employ-
ment after t periods. The individual did not find a suitable job and did not move
to nonparticipation during the first t − 1 periods, and accepted a job in the tth
period. In particular, the wage w associated with the job offer exceeds the reser-
vation wage after t periods. The contribution to the likelihood function of such
spell is
∫ ∞
−∞
I (unp(v) < φt−1)
(
t−1∏
s=1
(1− λs (1− Fs(φs)))
)
λt(1− Ft(φt))
∫
w≥φt
hw(w˜t|w)dFt(w)
(
t−1∏
s=0
hφ(φ˜s|φs)ds
)
dG(v|unp(v) < φ0)
As mentioned above the integral
∫
w≥φt
hw(w˜t|w)dFt(w) has a closed-form solution
and therefore needs no further attention.
In the derivation of the likelihood contributions above we assumed the data
are measured in the same unit of time as the model is specified. Recall that the
unit of time in the model is a week, while the data are measured in months.
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Therefore, if a transition to nonparticipation or to employment is observed in
a particular month, we integrate over the weeks in this month. Similarly, if a
post-unemployment wage is observed, we integrate over the possible lengths of
the unemployment spell. These integrals are solved straightforwardly.
5.2 Estimation method
The contributions to the likelihood functions mentioned in the previous subsec-
tion do not have a closed-form solution. In particular, the reservation wage path
depends on the instantaneous utility of nonparticipation, which is unobserved.
The other elements of the likelihood function, such as the job acceptance probabil-
ity, depend on the reservation wage. To overcome this problem, we use simulation
methods to compute the individual contributions to the log-likelihood function.
See Pakes (1986) for an early application of simulation estimation of dynamic
programming models and Bloemen (1997) for an application to a structural job
search model. In this subsection we briefly discuss the simulated maximum like-
lihood method we use to estimate the structural model.
In our framework it would be most straightforward to sample a fixed number
of draws for v from G(v|unp(v) < φ0) and then to evaluate the likelihood function
for each sampled value of v. However, for many values of v the likelihood con-
tributions are 0, because the argument within the indicator function I(·) is not
satisfied. This particular value of v could not have generated the observed data,
since the predicted month of entering nonparticipation is inconsistent with the
observed unemployment duration. For a finite number of draws, these type of
acceptance/rejection-procedures generally generate log-likelihood functions that
are discontinuous in the parameters. If the log-likelihood function is not smooth
in the parameters, convenient gradient methods are not useful in the optimization
procedure (see Stern, 1997).
Therefore, we use an alternative approach in line with Keane (1994). We
rewrite
I (φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1) dG(v|unp(v) < φ0) =
PrG[φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1]
PrG[unp(v) < φ0]
dG(v|φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1)
note that if unp(v) < φt−1, then also unp(v) < φ0. Next we determine the sup-
port of v for which φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1, and let this support be denoted by
(v, v). Similarly we determine the support (−∞, v0) on which the condition
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unp(v) < φ0 holds.
10 Now, we can simply rewrite PrG[φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1] =
Φ(v/σnp) − Φ(v/σnp) and PrG[unp(v) < φ0] = Φ(v0/σnp), where Φ(·) is the stan-
dard normal distribution function. Since we impose that v follows a normal
distribution function, generating realization from G(v|φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1) is not
very complicated. If u is a draw from a uniform distribution, then
v = σnpΦ
−1 (u(Φ(v/σnp)− Φ(v/σnp)) + Φ(v/σnp))
is a realization from G(v|φt ≤ unp(v) < φt−1) (see Stern, 1997). Before start-
ing the optimization routine of the log-likelihood function we generate for each
individual a set u1, . . . , uS from a uniform distribution function, which remains
constant during the complete optimization.
In general, for a finite number of draws simulated maximum likelihood is
inconsistent even if the number of observations tends to infinity. Gourieroux and
Montfort (1996) show that simulated maximum likelihood is consistent if both
the number of draws per observation S and the number of observations N go to
infinity. If also
√
N/S goes to 0, simulated maximum likelihood estimation is
asymptotically equivalent to ordinary maximum likelihood estimation. We take
S equal to 25. This is in line with the Monte Carlo evidence provided by Bo¨rsch-
Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), which shows that the bias in the parameter
estimates is negligible if S exceeds 20.
5.3 Estimation results
The estimation results of the structural model are provided in Table 4. Recall
that the structural model is specified such that the expected present value of
continuing job search must be decreasing at the moment an unemployed worker
enters nonparticipation. This imposes a restriction on the support of the para-
meters of the structural elements. We have checked if the parameter estimates
are in the interior of the support of the parameters. Since this is the case, the
presented standard errors are based on the regular asymptotic properties of max-
imum likelihood estimation.
The estimation results show significant negative duration dependence in the
wage offer distribution.11 The wage offer distribution decreases slightly faster
during the first 6 months after becoming unemployed than afterwards. Duration
10We use numerical methods to compute v, v and v0. This can easily be done using condition
(5) of Theorem 1 provided in the Appendix.
11We have also estimated the structural model without allowing for duration dependence in
the wage offer distribution. The test-statistic of the likelihood-ratio equals 200, while we only
exclude 8 parameters. Duration dependence in the wage offer distribution is thus extremely
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dependence in the job offer arrival rate is not significant, the p -value of a Wald-
test for joint significance equals 0.66.
The unobserved heterogeneity in the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer
distribution turns out to be significant. Most probability mass, 53% is located to
individuals with a relatively low job offer arrival rate, but on average higher wage
offers. Only 3% of all probability mass is assigned to individuals with high job
offer arrival rates and on average higher wage offers, while 17% of the probability
mass is located to both a low job offer arrival rate and on average lower wage
offers. The remaining 27% of the probability mass is located at a high job offer
arrival rate, but on average lower wage offers.
Being female and nationality are the only explanatory variables that have a
significant impact on both the probability of receiving job offers and the wage
offer distribution. Males not only receive on average more job offers, but also
get offered higher wages on average, we return to the differences between men
and women below.Individuals with a non-german nationality have lower proba-
bilities of receiving a job offer while being unemployed, but the wage offers are
on average better. Age is an important variable in the wage offer distribution.
Older individuals receive on average higher wage offers than younger individuals.
This can be explained from a human capital perspective, where age is a proxy for
total work experience. The utility of nonparticipation is significantly higher for
women, individuals with children, unemployed workers who were also nonpartic-
ipant before entering unemployment and individuals with higher unemployment
benefits. This latter finding probably reflect the fact that there is a positive rela-
tion between the level of the benefits in nonparticipation and in unemployment.
Since unemployment and nonparticipation in the data is self-reported many of
the individuals who stop searching for work continue receiving unemployment
benefits.
There are significant regional differences in both the probability of receiving
job offers and the wage offer distribution. The local unemployment rate is im-
portant in explaining regional differences in the wage offer distribution, a 1%
point increase in the local unemployment rates, reduces median wage offers with
1.6%. The local unemployment rate is highest in East-Germany. There is a pos-
sible labor demand explanation for this. After the German re-unification, large
investments were made in East-Germany. Mainly low-skilled (construction) jobs
became available, which explains wages are on average relatively low. The local
unemployment rate does not have a significant impact on the job offer arrival
important. The estimation results of the structural model without duration dependence in the
wage offer distribution are available on request.
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rate, but the regional indicator do have a significant impact. Job offer arrival
rates are lowest in East-Germany and Berlin.
The estimated yearly discount rate is around 21%, which is high, although well
within the range found in the empirical studies reviewed by Frederick, Loewen-
stein and O’Donogue (2002). It is well known that the estimated discount rate is
sensitive to the specification of the utility function. Our utility function assumes
that unemployed workers are risk neutral. If in fact the unemployed workers are
risk averse, the discount rates pick up some of the risk aversion and therefore the
estimated discount rates overestimates the true discount rate. Furthermore, we
have assumed that employment and nonparticipation are absorbing states. This
is obviously not always the case, which affects the estimated discount rate.
Tables 5 and 6 report separate estimation results for men and women. The
results coincide to some extent with those of the joint model. For both males and
females we find significant duration dependence in the wage offer distribution.
Duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate remains insignificant for both
males and females: the p-values of the Wald-test for the joint significance of all
coefficients of the intervals in the job offer arrival rate equal 0.16 for males and
0.93 for females. However, for men there is some negative duration dependence in
the job offer arrival rate, which becomes significant after 1 year of unemployment.
For women this type of duration dependence is absent and duration dependence
in the wage offer distribution is more pronounced than for men. The estimated
covariate effects differ somewhat between males and females. For men, marriage
increases the number of job offers, which does not hold for women. Having
children significantly reduces wage offers of women whilst not affecting the wage
offer distribution of men. The low significance of most variables signifies that
the identification of the separate results for males and females is poor. In the
remainder of the paper, we therefore focus on the results from the joint model.
5.4 Fit of the model and policy implications
As mentioned in Subsection 5.1, the estimated variance of the measurement errors
in the observed wages and reservation wages give an indication of the goodness of
fit of the model. In the data, the variance in the logarithm of wages is 0.15 and the
estimated variance of the measurement error of wages, ηˆ2w, is 0.062. This implies
that the model explains 59% of the variation in the logarithm of observed wages,
which is reasonable. The estimated variance in the measurement error of the
reservation wages can be decomposed as ηˆ2φ = E[log(φ˜)− log(φ)]2 + var(log(φ˜)−
log(φ)). The first component denotes the square-root of the bias, which equals
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0.00012. The model structurally overestimates reservation wages with around
1.1%. The second component is the unexplained variance, which equals 0.080.
Since the variance in the logarithm of the reservation wages equals 0.11, our
model can explain only 30% of the variance in logarithm of reservation wages.
There is thus hardly any systematic bias in the reservation wages, but the fit is
not extremely good.
Another indication for the goodness of fit of the model is comparing the es-
timation results with the estimation results of the reduced-form model discussed
in Section 4 and the actual data. Table 7 provides the fractions of unemploy-
ment spells that end in work and in nonparticipation within a given number of
months based on the actual data, the estimated competing risks model and the
structural model.12 The fit of the structural model seems reasonably good. In
particular, the fraction of unemployment spells that exit into work is estimated
properly. The structural model slightly underestimates the number of transitions
into nonparticipation after 1 year of unemployment. In this latter aspect the
reduced-form model performs better than the structural model.
Finally, we can compare the estimated covariate effects of the structural model
with the estimation results found in Section 4. The covariate effects in the wage
offer distribution of the structural model largely coincide with those of the esti-
mated random effects wage equation. The signs of the covariate effects always
coincide and the sizes of the effects are close to each other. The covariate effects
in the competing risks model are more difficult to compare. Except for the ben-
efits level the individual characteristics have the same effect on the exit rate to
nonparticipation in the reduced-form competing risks model as in the utility of
nonparticipation in the structural model. Comparing the exit rate to work in the
competing risks model with the job offer arrival rate in the structural model only
does not give a similar covariate effect for age. Furthermore, the local unemploy-
ment rate is more important in the reduced-form model than in the structural
model, while in the structural model the regional dummies have a significant
impact.
As mentioned earlier, the parameters of most interest are those describing du-
ration dependence. Since duration dependence is only substantial and significant
in the wage offer distribution our result provide evidence for only some theoret-
ical explanations for the high degree of persistence in European unemployment.
The negative duration in the wage offer distribution might imply that workers
lose skills while being unemployed (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). The ab-
12We have corrected for right-censoring in the data when computing the fractions of spells
that end within a given number of months into work and nonparticipation.
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sence of duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate makes stigmatization
of long-term unemployed workers or discouragement less likely explanations for
high levels of unemployment persistence (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1994;
Calmfors and Lang, 1995). The source of duration dependence is not the only
relevant factor for targeting unemployment policies. Machin and Manning (1999)
stress that also the timing is particularly important, active labor market policies
should be aimed at the period where the negative duration dependence is most
pronounced. Below we investigate how the duration dependence in the wage offer
distribution affects reservation wages and the exit rate to work.
For some particular types of unemployed workers we show the estimated reser-
vation wage path and probabilities of going to employment. We also show what
these paths would be if we subsequently ignore (i) the option of entering non-
participation, and (ii) the duration dependence in the wage offer distribution.13
We define two types of unemployed workers. Both are 30 years, have 10 years
of education, have the German nationality, entered unemployment after a period
of employment, live in South-Germany where the local unemployment rate is 6%
and receive 1000 D-Mark unemployment benefits. For the unobserved hetero-
geneity we assume that they are in the group with the most probability mass, i.e.
they have a low job offer arrival rate and on average high wage offers. The first
individual is a married man without children. The second individual is a single
mother. Figures 4 to 7 show for both of these types of individuals the reservation
wage paths and re-employment probabilities. It is clear that if the reservation
wage is always above the utility of nonparticipation, ignoring nonparticipation
does not affect the reservation wage path and the exit rate to work. As can be
seen from the figures this is the case for the married man without children.
One main result from the figures is that ignoring the duration dependence in
the wage offer distribution biases both the estimated reservation wage and the
re-employment probabilities. This stresses the importance of duration depen-
dence in explaining the transition from unemployment to work. Another result
is that the reservation wage path crosses the instantaneous utility of nonpartic-
ipation only for the single mother. For the married man without children the
reservation wage is much higher than the utility of being nonparticipant, imply-
ing that his behavior is only affected if the unobserved component in the utility
of nonparticipation has an extreme value. It is well known that, compared to
males, a relatively large proportion of females leave unemployment to nonpar-
13Since we do not find any substantial duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate, it
is not particularly interesting to consider the case where duration dependence in the job offer
arrival rate is ignored.
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ticipation (e.g. Machin and Manning, 1999). This is particularly the case for
single mothers, not only in Germany, but also in other OECD countries (see the
OECD Employment Outlook, 1991, 1995, 1999). This also implies the relevance
of taking nonparticipation into account when modeling the process of job search
of this group of unemployed workers.
Our estimation results are largely in agreement with the assumptions of Ljung-
qvist and Sargent (1998). They argue that the persistence in European unem-
ployment can be explained from a combination of the generous benefits system
and loss of skills at the start of unemployment and while being unemployed, while
the job offer arrival rate is assumed to be constant. Our results confirm these
assumptions. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) define 21 skill levels on a linear scale
and assume that while being unemployed each two weeks a worker has proba-
bility 0.2 that his skills drop 1 level. If workers who become unemployed are
on average in the 10th skill level, this implies that after 3 months workers have
lost on average 12% of their skills, after 6 months 24% of their skills, after one
year 48% of their skills and after two years 82% of their skills. If we compare
these percentages with our empirical findings we see that the expected wage as-
sociated to a job offer drops around 7% per 3 months during the first 6 months
and on average slightly over 4% per three months afterwards. After two years of
unemployment workers have lost about 40% of their skills.
One can think of a number of policies to stimulate re-employment. Lowering
unemployment benefits has a limited impact, a 50% reduction in unemployment
benefits increases the percentage of workers who finds work within 12 months
from 60.3% to 66.5%, while the percentage of individuals who entered nonpar-
ticipation decreased from 6.1% to 5.2% .14 The benefit reduction causes that 24
months after inflow 78.8% of the individuals is employed and 7.4% is in nonpar-
ticipation (compared to 71.6% and 8.5% without the benefit reduction). This
indicates that labor market outcomes are not very sensitive to the benefit level.
The main promise is in active labor market policies that increase the wage of-
fers by improving the skills of the unemployed workers, or on avoiding a loss of
skills amongst unemployed workers. Schooling and training programs or work
experience jobs are therefore expected to be more successful than, for example,
counseling or monitoring. Since the decline in the wage offer distribution is fastest
14The effect of unemployment benefits levels on re-employment has not been a focus of this
paper. We should interpret these results with care. A reduction in unemployment benefits
levels decreases reservation wages. Recall from Subsection 2.2 that the wage offer distribution
below the reservation wage is unidentified. The results from this policy experiment thus depend
on functional form assumptions.
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in the first year of unemployment, active labor market policies should start early
in the unemployment spell and thus not only focus on long-term unemployed
workers.
The policy implications above depend on the loss of skills interpretation as
the cause of the sharp negative duration dependence in wage offer distribution.
There are several other possible reasons however for negative duration dependence
during unemployment starting already in the first months after unemployment.
First, individuals lose their bargaining position at the moment they become unem-
ployed and their firm specific capital becomes worthless. An unemployed worker
recalled by a former employer will probably not have lost the firm specific skills
and can bargain a higher wage. Since recalls usually occur at the beginning of
the unemployment spell, these bias the wage offer distribution upwards for short
spells. Similarly, if at the start of the unemployment spell the individual knows
that he will start a job within a short period, the job is the result of on-the-job
search, which usually have higher bargained wages. However, such short periods
of unemployment are not very likely to show up in our self-reported data, as
these individuals will probably not classify themselves as being unemployed even
though they receive unemployment benefits.
Another possibility is that at the beginning of unemployment individuals use
their social network of employed friends and relatives to search for work. Since
the information concerning job search in such social networks is limited, ‘informal’
job search is only efficient at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Indeed,
Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) have shown that individuals lose contacts while
being unemployed. This is also a loss of human capital, but not one for which it
is clear how active labor market policies could compensate for.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that the transition from unemployment to non-
participation is a choice instead of a stochastic occurrence. Unemployed workers
are considered to permanently have the option of becoming nonparticipant, and
to quit searching for work at the moment their reservation wage decreases be-
low their utility of nonparticipation. Allowing for this transition improves the
identification of duration dependence in the structural elements of the job search
model.
The most important factors in explaining the utility of nonparticipation are
gender, having children, region of residence, and the labor market state before in-
flow into unemployment. Females, unemployed workers with children, individuals
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living in former West-Germany, and individuals who were prior to unemployment
out of the labor market have a higher utility of being nonparticipant.
Our results indicate that both duration dependence and unobserved hetero-
geneity are relevant in explaining job search and the transition from unemploy-
ment to employment. This has been recognized in reduced-form studies of labor
market transitions. However, most structural analyses of labor market behavior
do not account for non-stationarity in job search. For particular groups of work-
ers taking account of nonparticipation as an independent labor market state is
important, as it changes the complete reservation wage path and the transition
from unemployment to nonparticipation is endogenous and selective. This is par-
ticularly true for individuals who do not have very good labor market prospects
and have a high utility of nonparticipation, for example single mothers.
Finally, our estimation results show that during the unemployment spell the
rate at which job offers arrive is relatively constant but that the wage offer distri-
bution shifts downwards. The latter effect causes the reservation wage to decrease
over the unemployment duration. We argue that this shift in the wage offer dis-
tribution is associated with loss of skills. Our empirical results thus confirm the
assumption of workers losing skills during unemployment made by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998). One policy implication is that active labor market policies
aimed at improving the prospects of the unemployed workers should focus on
improving skills. Schooling and training programs or subsidized employment for
the unemployed are therefore expected to be more successful than, for example,
counseling or monitoring. Another policy relevant outcome is that, taking our
results at face value, the fastest loss-of-skills occurs in the first year of unemploy-
ment. This means that the potential productivity gain of active labor market
policies that halt a loss-of-skill is greater with early intervention than with late
intervention.
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Appendix: The job search model
Our model consists of assumption 1-5 from Van den Berg (1990a), and adds
the permanent option of going into nonparticipation. The model assumptions
provided in this appendix are slightly more general than the assumptions of the
model discussed in Section 2. For completeness we summarize all assumptions
below:
Assumption 1 For each t ≥ 0, the wage offer distribution has the following
properties: (i) Ft(w) is a continuous function, which is strictly monotonically
increasing on the support 〈αt, βt〉 (with 0 ≤ αt < βt ≤ ∞), (ii) Ft(αt) = 0, (iii)
limw→βt Ft(w) = 1, and (iv) the mean is bounded.
Assumption 2 For each t ≥ 0, the job offer arrival rate λt satisfies 0 ≤ λt ≤ K
for a fixed K < ∞. Also, the benefits level while being unemployed, bt, satisfies
0 ≤ bt ≤ K.
Assumption 3 Except for only a finite number of points (possibly 0), Ft(w), αt,
bt and λt are continuous functions of t. If a function is discontinuous in a point,
say at t∗, then it is right-continuous and the left-hand limit of this function at t∗
exists.
Assumption 4 The functions Ft(w), bt and λt are constant on [T,∞〉 for some
positive T .
Assumption 5 The discount rate ρ satisfies 0 < ρ < ∞.
Assumption 6 At each t ≥ 0 an unemployed worker has the option of moving
into the absorbing state of nonparticipation, where the instantaneous utility equals
unp,t. unp,t is continuous for all t and constant on [T,∞〉 for some positive T .
The optimal strategy of an unemployed worker is characterized by the following
theorems:
Theorem 1 (Determination of the reservation wage path) Under As-
sumption 1-6, the optimal strategy consists of a time to go into nonparticipation
t¯ and a reservation wage path φt(t¯) for t ≤ t¯, given t¯. The reservation wage path
follows the differential equation
∂φt(t¯)
∂t
= ρφt(t¯)− ρbt − λt
∫ ∞
φt(t¯)
(w − φt(t¯)) dFt(w) (4)
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for each t ≤ t¯ where the functions λt, bt, and F (w; t) are continuous. If these
functions are not continuous in t, then the right-hand side of (4) gives the right-
hand derivative of φt in t. The left-hand derivative is calculated by replacing the
functions in (4) by their left-hand limits at that discontinuity point. There holds
φt¯(t¯) = ρ
∫∞
t¯
unp,t exp(−ρ(t − t¯))dt if t¯ ≤ T and φt¯(t¯) = rT (rT ) if t¯ = ∞. Here
rt(x) follows from rt(x) = bt +
λt
ρ
∫∞
x
(w− x)dFt(w) for all t. Now, if 0 < t¯ < ∞,
then t¯ should satisfy the condition
lim
t↑t¯
rt(φt(t)) ≥ unp,t¯ ≥ lim
t↓t¯
rt(φt(t)) (5)
Proof:
The reservation wage path in equation (4) directly follows from Van den Berg
(1990a), where entering nonparticipation can be interpreted as accepting a job
with certainty at t¯ with wage w = ρ
∫∞
t¯
unp,t exp(−ρ(t− t¯))dt.
We prove condition (5) by noting that for points t¯ where λt, bt, and F (w; t)
are continuous, lim∆↓0
φt¯−∆(t¯)−φt¯−∆(t¯−∆)
∆
= 0. This implies that just before t¯ the
individual is indifferent between entering nonparticipation and searching for work
until t¯. The condition can be expanded because
φt¯−∆(t¯) = ρ∆rt¯−∆(φt¯(t¯)) + (1− ρ∆)φt¯(t¯) + σ(∆)
and
φt¯−∆(t¯− ∆) = φt¯(t¯)− ∆dφt¯(t¯)
dt¯
+ σ(∆)
= φt¯(t¯)− ρ∆
d
∫∞
t¯
unp,t exp(−ρ(t− t¯))dt
dt¯
+ σ(∆)
= φt¯(t¯)− ∆ρ(φt¯(t¯)− unp,t¯) + σ(∆)
Solving for rt¯−∆(φt¯(t¯)) and taking the limit of ∆ to 0 gives rt¯(φt¯(t¯)) = unp,t¯.
For points where λt, bt, and F (w; t) are not continuous, an analogue reasoning
implies we have to replace rt¯(φt¯(t¯)) by the left and right-hand limits of rt(φt(t))
at t¯, which gives condition (5). 
Condition (5) becomes simpler in the special case considered in this paper where
unp,t is constant for all t. Since φt¯(t¯) = unp, the condition simplifies to limt↑t¯ rt(unp) ≥
unp ≥ limt↓t¯ rt(unp), i.e. individuals go to nonparticipation when the instanta-
neous value of search equals the instantaneous utility of nonparticipation. In this
case, the optimal moment of entering nonparticipation satisfies the condition
lim
t↑t¯
bt +
λt
ρ
∫ ∞
unp
(x− unp)dFt(x) ≥ unp ≥ lim
t↓t¯
bt +
λt
ρ
∫ ∞
unp
(x− unp)dFt(x)
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There might be no values or multiple values t¯ that satisfy condition (5). To
determine the optimal moment of entering nonparticipation we use the next the-
orem:
Theorem 2 (Selection of the optimum) Let S denote the union of the set
of all values t¯ that satisfy condition (5) and {0,∞}. The optimal time of entering
nonparticipation satisfies
t¯ = arg max
s∈S
φ0(s)
Proof:
The proof of this theorem is straightforward. Out of a finite number of possible
moments of entering nonparticipation, the unemployed worker chooses the mo-
ment which generates the highest present life-time utility. The points t¯ = 0 and
t¯ = ∞ allow for the possibility that the unemployed worker enters nonpartici-
pation immediately (r0(φ0(0)) < unp,0) and that the unemployed worker never
enters nonparticipation (rT (rT ) > unp,T ). 
Under some conditions the set S includes additional to {0,∞} at most one pos-
sible t¯. This is when rt(x) is non-increasing over time for any x and when∫∞
t
unp,s exp(−ρ(s))ds is non-decreasing for all t. Sufficient, but not necessary,
conditions for this situation are:
- bt and λt are non-increasing.
- Ft(w) first-order stochastically dominates Ft+τ (w) for all t and τ > 0.
- unp,t is non-decreasing.
In these circumstances there can be only one t¯ that maximizes lifetime utility.
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Exit Observed R-C Total
Destination Work Nonp.
Individual characteristics
Age (in years) 30.2 29.4 30.7
(7.2) (6.8) (7.5)
Male 74% 2% 25% 1305
Female 56% 14% 30% 1340
Children 64% 9% 27% 1800
No children 67% 3% 30% 845
Education (in years) 11.3 10.9 11.1
(2.4) (2.3) (2.3)
Marital status missing 64% 8% 28% 276
Married 64% 10% 26% 1242
Single 67% 4% 29% 1127
German nationality 65% 7% 28% 2090
Non-German nationality 64% 9% 27% 555
Regions
South-Germany 71% 8% 22% 565
Mid-Germany 69% 8% 23% 251
North-Germany 63% 11% 27% 650
East-Germany 63% 5% 32% 1029
Berlin 63% 7% 30% 150
Labor market state before inflow into unemployment
Employment 67% 5% 28% 2129
Out of the labor force 55% 18% 27% 516
Local unemployment rate
0.11 0.10 0.12
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
Benefits level
(in D-Mark) 996 831 952
(522) (466) (514)
Reservation wage
Observed 55% 7% 38% 368
(in D-Mark) 1617 1352 1540
(601) (447) (478)
Unemployment duration
(in months) 6.1 9.2
(5.4) (5.4)
Post-unemployment wage
Observed 100% 1243
(in D-Mark) 2287
(882)
# spells 1720 199 726 2645
# individuals 1938
Explanatory note: We distinguish three types of spells: spells observed to exit into work, spells observed to exit into nonpartici-
pation, and right-censored spells. The table shows how the spells of individuals with certain characteristics are distributed over
the three types of spells. For the individual characteristics ‘Age’, ‘Education’ and ‘local unemployment rate’ and for ‘Benefits
level’, ‘Reservation wage’, ‘Unemployment duration’ and ‘Post-unemployment wage’, we give the subsample means (and standard
deviations). The last column provides the total number of spells of individuals in the sample with a certain characteristic.
Table 1: Some characteristics of the data set.
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Work Nonparticipation
θw θn
Unobserved heterogeneity
va −1.59 (0.48) −6.29 (1.74)
vb −2.74 (0.51) −4.85 (1.21)
vc −5.58 (0.58) −5.34 (1.63)
paa 0
pab 0
pac 0.32 (0.15)
pba 0
pbb 0.60 (0.21)
pbc 0
pca 0.08 (0.046)
pcb 0
pcc 0
Individual characteristics
log(Age/10) −0.23 (0.17) −0.83 (0.40)
Female −0.73 (0.073) 1.90 (0.30)
Children −0.035 (0.074) 0.62 (0.23)
log(Education) 0.87 (0.19) −0.15 (0.44)
Married 0.099 (0.086) 0.67 (0.20)
Marital status unobserved 0.27 (0.16) 0.45 (0.36)
Non-German nationality −0.37 (0.12) 0.0020 (0.27)
Inflow after out of the labor force −0.18 (0.084) 0.48 (0.16)
log(Benefits/100) −0.13 (0.062) −0.11 (0.16)
Local unemployment rate −1.05 (0.24) −1.03 (0.61)
Regions
South-Germany 0 0
Mid-Germany −0.10 (0.12) −0.19 (0.32)
North-Germany 0.043 (0.13) 0.24 (0.32)
East-Germany 0.31 (0.25) −0.22 (0.65)
Berlin 0.16 (0.23) −0.0066 (0.54)
Duration dependence (monthly)
λ1−−3 0 0
λ4−−6 −0.11 (0.069) 0.17 (0.25)
λ7−−9 −0.14 (0.091) 0.67 (0.25)
λ10−−12 −0.099 (0.11) 1.09 (0.25)
λ13−−15 −0.22 (0.14) 1.07 (0.28)
λ16−−18 −0.27 (0.16) 0.34 (0.39)
λ19−−21 −0.32 (0.19) 0.55 (0.44)
λ22−− −0.33 (0.22) −0.059 (0.58)
logL −6832.46
# individuals 1938
# spells 2645
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2: Estimation results of the competing risks model.
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Intercept
α 6.86 (0.13)
Individual characteristics
log(Age/10) 0.15 (0.055)
Female −0.24 (0.021)
Children −0.039 (0.022)
log(Education) 0.25 (0.051)
Married −0.030 (0.027)
Marital status unobserved 0.0003 (0.054)
Non-German nationality 0.033 (0.033)
Inflow after out of the labor force −0.070 (0.024)
log(Benefits/100) 0.18 (0.019)
Local unemployment rate −0.38 (0.70)
Previous unemployment duration (in months) −0.0080 (0.0019)
Regions
South-Germany 0
Mid-Germany 0.024 (0.041)
North-Germany −0.011 (0.039)
East-Germany −0.27 (0.074)
Berlin −0.0007 (0.066)
Standard deviations
σv 0.18 (0.016)
σε 0.26 (0.0084)
logL 829.77
# individuals 1033
# observations 1243
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3: Estimation results of the random effects wage equation.
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Job offer Wage offer Utility of
arrival rate distribution nonparticipation
λ µ unp
Duration dependence (month)
0 0 0
3 0.034 (0.12) −0.049 (0.024)
6 0.27 (0.16) −0.14 (0.033)
9 0.075 (0.17) −0.16 (0.036)
12 −0.077 (0.19) −0.20 (0.041)
15 0.016 (0.22) −0.28 (0.048)
18 −0.12 (0.25) −0.29 (0.053)
21 0.0034 (0.27) −0.36 (0.061)
24 0.059 (0.33) −0.40 (0.080)
Unobserved heterogeneity
va −0.27 (0.97) 7.61 (0.16)
vb −3.51 (0.79) 7.19 (0.15)
paa 0.032 (0.020)
pab 0.27 (0.052)
pba 0.53 (0.068)
pbb 0.17 (0.050)
Individual characteristics
Intercept 6.94 (0.60)
log(Benefits/100) 0.33 (0.10)
log(Age/10) 0.076 (0.28) 0.20 (0.058) −0.21 (0.21)
Female −1.14 (0.17) −0.19 (0.026) 0.59 (0.30)
Children −0.017 (0.12) −0.014 (0.027) 0.33 (0.15)
log(Education) 0.39 (0.31) 0.096 (0.056) −0.12 (0.27)
Married 0.12 (0.15) −0.040 (0.029) 0.19 (0.13)
Marital status unobserved 0.61 (0.25) −0.099 (0.057) 0.049 (0.19)
Non-German nationality −0.90 (0.21) 0.10 (0.040) 0.026 (0.14)
Inflow after out of the labor force −0.24 (0.13) −0.013 (0.028) 0.41 (0.19)
Local unemployment rate −0.83 (0.91) −1.57 (0.81)
Regions
South-Germany 0 0 0
Mid-Germany −0.51 (0.23) 0.087 (0.046) −0.11 (0.16)
North-Germany −0.66 (0.22) 0.090 (0.043) −0.0063 (0.13)
East-Germany −0.95 (0.42) −0.059 (0.084) −0.67 (0.21)
Berlin −0.85 (0.37) 0.20 (0.073) −0.12 (0.18)
ρ (yearly) 0.21 (0.10)
σw 0.22 (0.021)
σnp 0.53 (0.16)
Measurement errors
ηw 0.26 (0.0069)
ηφ 0.26 (0.011)
logL −19598
# individuals 1938
# spells 2645
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Estimation results of the structural model.
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Job offer Wage offer Utility of
arrival rate distribution nonparticipation
λ µ unp
Duration dependence (month)
0 0
3 0.070 (0.037) −0.071 (0.057)
6 0.024 (0.39) −0.18 (0.060)
9 −0.49 (0.39) −0.074 (0.069)
12 −0.48 (0.43) −0.15 (0.081)
15 −1.35 (0.47) −0.11 (0.085)
18 −1.12 (0.60) −0.15 (0.13)
21 −1.01 (0.56) −0.13 (0.12)
24 −0.82 (1.15) −0.38 (0.16)
Unobserved heterogeneity
va −1.80 (1.34) 7.30 (0.22)
vb −3.75 (1.19) 7.60 (0.22)
paa 0.32 (0.16)
pab 0.26 (0.090)
pba 0.28 (0.11)
pbb 0.14 (0.16)
Individual characteristics
Intercept 6.36 (1.12)
log(Benefits/100) 0.80 (1.20)
log(Age/10) −0.27 (0.39) 0.19 (0.078) 0.34 (0.64)
Children −0.0003 (0.18) 0.013 (0.031) 0.22 (0.46)
log(Education) 0.33 (0.44) 0.092 (0.074) −0.31 (1.22)
Married 0.74 (0.28) −0.016 (0.044) −0.48 (1.02)
Marital status unobserved 0.45 (0.33) −0.14 (0.064) −0.26 (0.52)
Non-German nationality −0.66 (0.30) 0.12 (0.052) 0.0096 (0.38)
Inflow after out of the labor force 0.15 (0.23) 0.0079 (0.043) 0.30 (0.77)
Local unemployment rate −0.37 (0.36) −1.58 (1.03)
Regions
South-Germany 0 0 0
Mid-Germany −0.55 (0.32) 0.090 (0.064) −0.23 (0.58)
North-Germany −0.65 (0.33) 0.094 (0.056) −0.15 (0.75)
East-Germany −0.64 (0.60) −0.12 (0.11) −0.81 (1.52)
Berlin −0.66 (0.57) 0.065 (0.11) 0.40 (1.04)
ρ (yearly) 0.21 (0.085)
σw 0.17 (0.032)
σnp 0.89 (0.076)
Measurement errors
ηw 0.25 (0.010)
ηφ 0.23 (0.018)
logL −9642
# individuals 902
# spells 1305
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Estimation results of the structural model only for men.
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Job offer Wage offer Utility of
arrival rate distribution nonparticipation
λ µ unp
Duration dependence (month)
0 0
3 0.030 (0.078) −0.032 (0.018)
6 0.20 (0.16) −0.094 (0.036)
9 0.10 (0.17) −0.12 (0.040)
12 0.0076 (0.20) −0.17 (0.047)
15 0.092 (0.23) −0.25 (0.059)
18 −0.049 (0.27) −0.26 (0.065)
21 0.25 (0.37) −0.36 (0.091)
24 0.083 (0.46) −0.37 (0.13)
Unobserved heterogeneity
va −0.54 (1.36) 7.51 (0.25)
vb −3.86 (1.05) 7.04 (0.25)
paa 0.28 (0.034)
pab 0.26 (0.041)
pba 0.30 (0.035)
pbb 0.16 (0.028)
Individual characteristics
Intercept 7.03 (0.75)
log(Benefits/100) 0.20 (0.10)
log(Age/10) 0.071 (0.35) 0.22 (0.089) 0.27 (0.35)
Children −0.043 (0.16) −0.087 (0.039) 0.39 (0.26)
log(Education) 0.33 (0.41) 0.028 (0.085) 0.038 (0.29)
Married −0.11 (0.19) −0.085 (0.043) 0.30 (0.22)
Marital status unobserved 0.73 (0.43) 0.039 (0.12) 0.50 (0.33)
Non-German nationality −0.91 (0.31) 0.040 (0.069) 0.060 (0.23)
Inflow after out of the labor force −0.52 (0.17) −0.024 (0.041) 0.47 (0.31)
Local unemployment rate −0.39 (0.88) −1.53 (1.33)
Regions
South-Germany 0 0 0
Mid-Germany −0.65 (0.31) 0.16 (0.071) −0.078 (0.25)
North-Germany −0.68 (0.31) 0.14 (0.072) 0.082 (0.18)
East-Germany −1.38 (0.57) 0.084 (0.14) −0.57 (0.25)
Berlin −1.46 (0.51) 0.39 (0.12) −0.37 (0.37)
ρ (yearly) 0.27 (0.080)
σw 0.22 (0.027)
σnp 0.78 (0.046)
Measurement errors
ηw 0.27 (0.010)
ηφ 0.27 (0.014)
logL −9858
# individuals 1036
# spells 1340
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Estimation results of the structural model only for women.
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Data Reduced-form model Structural model
month work nonpart. work nonpart. work nonpart.
1 10.9% 0.6% 11.2% 0.5% 10.3% 0.6%
(0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (1.0)
2 20.8% 0.9% 20.3% 0.9% 19.0% 1.2%
(0.7) (0.2) (0.5) (1.5)
3 28.9% 1.3% 27.8% 1.4% 26.4% 1.7%
(0.9) (0.2) (0.7) (1.1)
4 34.6% 1.8% 33.5% 1.8% 32.8% 2.4%
(0.9) (0.2) (0.8) (1.6)
5 39.1% 2.0% 38.4% 2.2% 38.3% 2.9%
(0.9) (0.3) (0.8) (1.8)
6 44.2% 2.7% 42.7% 2.6% 43.0% 3.3%
(1.0) (0.3) (0.8) (1.9)
7 47.8% 3.2% 46.3% 3.2% 47.2% 3.7%
(1.0) (0.3) (0.9) (1.3)
8 50.9% 3.9% 49.6% 3.7% 50.7% 4.1%
(1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (1.3)
9 54.0% 4.4% 52.4% 4.2% 53.7% 4.5%
(1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (1.7)
10 56.3% 5.0% 55.1% 4.9% 56.3% 5.0%
(1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (2.7)
11 58.2% 5.4% 57.4% 5.6% 58.5% 5.6%
(1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (1.1)
12 61.3% 6.4% 59.5% 6.2% 60.3% 6.1%
(1.1) (0.5) (0.9) (1.3)
13 63.3% 7.2% 61.2% 6.7% 61.9% 6.6%
(1.0) (0.5) (0.9) (2.0)
14 64.6% 7.4% 62.7% 7.2% 63.3% 7.0%
(1.0) (0.5) (0.9) (1.9)
15 65.9% 7.8% 64.1% 7.6% 64.6% 7.3%
(1.1) (0.6) (0.9) (2.1)
16 67.1% 7.9% 65.3% 7.8% 65.7% 7.4%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (1.3)
17 68.2% 8.2% 66.4% 8.0% 66.7% 7.6%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (1.9)
18 69.3% 8.4% 67.5% 8.2% 67.6% 7.7%
(1.1) (0.6) (0.9) (2.3)
19 70.2% 8.7% 68.3% 8.4% 68.4% 7.9%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (2.1)
20 71.1% 8.8% 69.2% 8.6% 69.2% 8.1%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (1.6)
21 71.9% 9.0% 69.9% 8.8% 69.9% 8.3%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (2.2)
22 72.4% 9.0% 70.7% 8.9% 70.5% 8.3%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (3.1)
23 73.3% 9.1% 71.4% 9.0% 71.1% 8.4%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (2.2)
24 74.0% 9.2% 72.0% 9.0% 71.6% 8.5%
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (1.0)
Explanatory note: standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Percentage of spells that end in work and nonparticipation within a
given number on months in the data, according to the reduced-form competing
risks model and according to the structural model.
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Figure 1: The reservation wage path with and without allowing for a permanent
option of entering nonparticipation.
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Figure 2: The monthly unemployment rate in Germany and stratified to former
West-Germany and East-Germany. For East-Germany reliable unemployment
figures only came available in 1991. (Source: Eurostat)
Figure 3: The empirical hazard rates from unemployment to employment and
nonparticipation.
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Figure 4: The estimated reservation wage path (man, 30 years, married, no chil-
dren, 1000 DMark benefits, 10 years of education, living in South-Germany with
a local unemployment rate of 6%, inflow from employment, German nationality).
Figure 5: The estimated re-employment probability (man, 30 years, married, no
children, 1000 DMark benefits, 10 years of education, living in South-Germany
with a local unemployment rate of 6%, inflow from employment, German nation-
ality).
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Figure 6: The estimated reservation wage path (woman, 30 years, single, children,
1000 DMark benefits, 10 years of education, living in South-Germany with a local
unemployment rate of 6%, inflow from employment, German nationality).
Figure 7: The estimated re-employment probability (woman, 30 years, single,
children, 1000 DMark benefits, 10 years of education, living in South-Germany
with a local unemployment rate of 6%, inflow from employment, German nation-
ality).
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